Dr. John Connor, OnPoint testifying expert and Emeritus Economics Professor at Purdue University, presented antitrust research at the International Symposium on Imperfect Forms of Collusion held on January 12th and 13th in Cape Town, South Africa. The research paper, coauthored with OnPoint expert Dr. Dan Werner, provides a meta-analysis of contemporary bid-rigging episodes. The authors review several historical case studies and academic articles before empirically analyzing the determinants of overcharges in a sample of cartels penalized for bid-rigging behavior.
Using econometric analysis, their research suggests that market structure and macroeconomic pressures are significant determinants of overcharges that bid-rigging cartels are able to achieve. For example, cartels with many different buyers are found to achieve lower overcharges, perhaps because it is harder for cartel members to ensure bid-rigging compliance when there are a large number of individual transactions. In addition, the authors find preliminary evidence that cartels operating during macroeconomic downturns are able to achieve greater price elevation than cartels operating during boom cycles.
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